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Abstract—Configuration management in networks with highest
security demands must not depend on just one administrator and
her device. Otherwise, problems can be caused by mistakes or
malicious behavior of this admin, or when her computer got com-
promised, which allows an attacker to abuse the administrator’s
far-reaching permissions.
Instead, we propose to use a reliable and resilient configuration
management process orchestrated by a configuration management
system (CMS). This can be achieved by separation of concerns
(proposing a configuration vs. authorizing it), employing multi-
party authorization (MPA), and enforcing that only authorized
configurations can be deployed. This results in a configuration
management process that is decentralized on a human, decision-
making level, and a technical, device level.
However, due to different opinions or adversarial interference,
the result of an MPA process can end in a conflict. This raises the
question how such conflicts can be mediated in a better way than
just employing majority voting, which is insufficient in certain
situations. As an alternative, this paper introduces building blocks
of customizable conflict mediation strategies which we integrated
into our CMS TANCS [1]. The conflict mediation functionality
as well as the initial TANCS implementation run on top of the
distributed ledger and smart contract framework Hyperledger
Fabric which makes all processes resilient and tamper-resistant.
Index Terms—Distributed Management, Configuration Man-
agement, Security Services
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of advanced persistent threats (APT), it is almost
safe to predict that any corporate, governmental, or military
network that is important enough will be compromised sooner
or later. The effects of such attacks range from data leaks to
tampered control processes of critical infrastructures.
One crucial factor for network security is meticulous con-
figuration management. However, management processes that
depend on just one administrator and her device can fail and
cause problems.
An inexperienced or careless administrator, for instance,
might accidentally deploy a faulty configuration to managed
devices and cause an availability problem, or create a security
weakness that can be exploited later.
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Even more problematic are disgruntled insiders who actively
try to harm the organization they are working for [2, p. 53] [3,
p. 10]. For this reason, an admin who turns malicious is a
major threat.
Besides internal issues, problems related to network manage-
ment also emerge from the outside of the network. In APTs,
attackers often target administrators directly using water holing
or spear phishing attacks [4, p. 28] pursuing the target of
compromising the admin’s account or computer.
This is highly problematic, as admins often use just one
cryptographic key to authenticate themselves to managed
entities. If the attacker has access to this key, she is able to
manage the network as she pleases.
In the remaining paper, we argue for decentralizing configu-
ration management in order to avoid single points of failure on
technical and in particular on human level. For this purpose,
we detail the benefits of separation of concerns in management
processes and of multi-party authorization (MPA) of new con-
figurations before deploying them, see Sect. II. Due to different
opinions and also adversarial interference, MPA processes of
new configurations can end in a conflict. To better understand
the causes of such error cases, we conduct an analysis in
Sect. III. Based on these insights, we argue why a simple
majority vote is not enough to mediate such conflicts. As an
alternative we present building blocks which can be assembled
to customizable conflict mediation strategies, see Sect. IV. The
next Sect. V outlines how we integrated discussed building
blocks and mediation strategies with our previously published
configuration management system TANCS. Lastly, we discuss
our work in Sect. VI, compare it to related work, c.f. Sect. VII,
and conclude the paper in Sect. VIII.
II. AVOIDING SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE BY
DECENTRALIZED CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
As we already motivated, one careless administrator who
accidentally deploys a faulty configuration, one administrator
who intentionally deploys a malicious configuration, or one
compromised device or cryptographic key abused to deploy a
malicious configuration can be enough to pose a serious threat
to the security and availability of a networked IT system.
For this reason, we argue that it is time to rethink configu-
ration management processes from a reliability and resilience
standpoint, which suggests that single points of failure should
be avoided.978-3-903176-15-7 © 2019 IFIP
Instead of having a centralized configuration management
process where only one admin can create and immediately de-
ploy a new configuration, we propose to split the configuration
management process in different steps. These steps all need to
be performed by different persons or entities using different
devices, and are orchestrated by an entity called configuration
management system (CMS).
In the proposal phase, an administrator proposes a new con-
figuration and hands it over to the CMS. In the review phase,
several reviewers independently assess the configuration and
individually communicate their approval or refusal to the CMS.
In the authorization phase, the CMS decides whether to finally
accept and deploy, or to refuse the configuration based on the
input of reviewers.
The result of the just described separation of concerns
combined with the multi-party authorization (MPA) process of
the proposed configuration is decentralized, which is beneficial
on two levels: First, the distribution of the configuration
management process to various persons prevents on a human,
decision-making level that an individual careless or malicious
administrator can cause harm to the network. Second, the
distribution of the process to several devices used by human
actors prevents on a technical, device level that individual com-
promised devices or cryptographic keys can be successfully
abused to deploy a malicious configuration.
III. ANALYSIS OF CONFLICTS AND ATTACKS ON
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
This section analyzes causes of conflicts in MPA processes
with regard to decentralized configuration management. For
our analysis we use the different process phases as described
in Sect. II. We however assume that the authorization phase
cannot be tampered with easily when a tamper-resistant CMS
like TANCS, see Sect. V-A, is used. For this reason, we focus
on the proposal and review phase, which are close to human
actors, and hence prone to faults and manipulation.
a) Proposal phase: In this phase,
a proposer can either propose a valid or invalid config-
uration. Valid configurations are correct and suitable for a
managed device. Invalid configurations are either faulty when
proposed from a careless administrator, or malicious when
proposed from a rogue admin or an attacker from remote.
b) Review phase: In this phase,
each reviewer can either agree to or reject a proposed con-
figuration. The result of this step can either correspond to or
conflict with the actual validity of the proposed configuration.
We consider agreeing to an invalid configuration as either a
flaw or an attack. Similarly, rejecting a valid configuration is
either a flaw or an attack.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR MEDIATION STRATEGIES OF
MPA CONFLICTS
Sect. II discussed the advantages of decentralizing a con-
figuration management process by separation of concerns and
multi-party authorization (MPA). Due to the reasons given in
Sect. III, the MPA process can end in a conflict. Therefore, a
mechanism that mediates such conflicts is needed.
In situations where human beings have different opinions
about a subject, consensus is traditionally achieved by mecha-
nisms like majority voting. Majority voting, however, returns
the wrong result when the minority of answers is right and the
majority is wrong. Such a scenario emerges, for instance, if
one careful reviewer finds a flaw or a malicious statement in a
configuration that other reviewers did not spot. With majority
voting, the configuration would be approved which invalidates
the benefits of decentralizing the decision-making process.
However, majority voting would be sufficient in other
scenarios. In cases where one adversary has compromised
a reviewer’s machine and tries to stop a valid configuration
by refusing it, overruling the minority would yield the right
decision, i.e. accepting this configuration.
This dilemma shows that more elaborate and targeted con-
flict mediation strategies than majority voting are needed in
networks with very high security demands. The two goals of
a suitable conflict mediation strategy must be 1) to increase
the chance of rejecting a malicious configuration, and 2)
to increase the chance of accepting a valid configuration
when under attack. For this purpose, we propose various
building blocks (BB) that can be assembled to different conflict
mediation strategies as outlined in Sect. IV-F.
The essential idea of this approach is to perform additional
“rounds” after the initial MPA yielded a conflict. In these
rounds, reviewers are enabled to rethink and change their
opinion, and to commit a new decision. At the end of a round,
the conflict is either resolved – as the CMS finally accepts
or refuses the configuration – or a further round needs to be
executed.
A. BB1: Request confirmation
BB1 pursues the idea of informing reviewers that there is a
conflict, and giving them the opportunity to correct their an-
swer. As additional information, each reviewer receives short
“commit messages” entered by other reviewers that explain
why they, for instance, rejected the respective configuration in
a previous round.
BB1 is helpful in situations where individual reviewers did
not notice a problem in a configuration. Using the additional
input, they most likely spot the problem and correct their
decision, which helps to reach consensus on this configuration.
B. BB2: Confirmation via 2nd channel
If we consider adversaries able to control devices from
remote, it is also possible that a reviewer got impersonated
and did not even notice that, for instance, a valid configuration
was rejected from her computer. Further interaction with this
reviewer is not possible as the adversary can intercept and
answer every inquiry from the CMS.
For this reason, BB2 tries to evade the compromised device
by using a second – hopefully still trustworthy – channel to
the reviewer, e.g. using a second device. Using this channel, a
reviewer can be requested to confirm that a particular review
decision committed from her computer to the CMS was indeed
given by her. If the admin does not confirm, the CMS can
exclude the compromised device from the process.
C. BB3: Incorporate additional reviewers
BB3 follows the approach to incorporate additional review-
ers in the process. Situations where this is beneficial include
replacing reviewers whose computer got compromised.
BB3 is also helpful to collect additional information from
new reviewers, which can be used in BB1 to allow reviewers
to rethink their decision.
D. BB4: Direct conflict mediation via chat
We regard BB1, 2 and 3 as still being only modestly
interrupting and hence being quite “inexpensive”. However,
we expect that it is not always possible to achieve consensus
using these building blocks. For this reason, BB4 and 5 follow
the idea to enable reviewers to resolve a conflict in a more
direct and interactive manner.
BB4 adds a chat-like function to the CMS, which enables
a direct discourse between reviewers. To avoid that a single
reviewer is able to give the final decision of the whole
group, all involved reviewers individually commit the group’s
decision to the CMS.
E. BB5: Direct conflict mediation in person
BB5 is a variant of BB4. However, instead of trying to
mediate the conflict in a chat, reviewers must meet and mediate
the situation in person. As in BB4, each reviewer commits
individually the agreement on decision to the CMS to prevent
that a single reviewer can give this final decision. An additional
benefit of BB5 is that it helps when all communication
channels to a reviewer are compromised.
F. Examples of composite conflict mediation strategies
As we have discussed, each of the building blocks has
different properties and associated costs as it requires more or
less additional effort from reviewers. For this reason, conflict
mediation strategies can be tailored to different security re-
quirements of managed devices or situations. These strategies
can be defined on a per device basis or for groups of devices
with similar security requirements, and be worked off by the
CMS when the initial MPA process ends in a conflict.
Mediating a conflict that concerns a group of highly impor-
tant entities, like the network’s firewall or identity management
system, is worth investing a lot of effort. So, a mediation strat-
egy that includes all building blocks, maybe even repeatedly,
could be specified.
Investing the same effort is maybe inappropriate for a group
of lesser relevant components in the network. In such cases,
the mediation strategy does not include expensive building
blocks like BB3 - BB5. Instead, the system will abort conflict
mediation and reject the configuration after BB2 is finished
without consensus.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We added the described conflict mediation functionality to
our CMS TANCS [1]. TANCS stands for tamper-resistant and
auditable network configuration management system.
A. TANCS
TANCS is able to conduct and enforce the configuration
management process described in Sect. II, i.e., it requires that
multiple human experts review and approve a new configura-
tion. Only if a configuration has been accepted by all reviewers
specified in a device-specific policy, the current TANCS imple-
mentation will set the status of this configuration to authorized.
Managed devices, which are required to be locked down to
prevent other configuration mechanisms, automatically pull au-
thorized configurations addressed to themselves from TANCS
and apply them locally. Besides this functionality, we ensure
accountability and traceability of the entire process for forensic
purposes.
TANCS runs on top of Fabric [5], which is a distributed
ledger and smart contract framework developed by the Hyper-
ledger project of the Linux Foundation. Every input from an
administrator or reviewer sent via a command line client (CLI)
to TANCS is processed by a smart contract running on multi-
ple nodes in the Fabric peer-to-peer network. Furthermore, all
in- and outputs of these operations are stored in a redundant,
non-modifiable and inerasable manner in the distributed ledger
established by the Fabric peers. As long as the majority of
nodes is honest, individual adversaries are not able to forge or
erase the outcomes of the configuration management process,
which is why TANCS is tamper-resistant.
A further interesting fact is that TANCS is inherently able to
support configuration management of IT infrastructure shared
across different stakeholders, who are not even required to
trust each other. In such cases, every stakeholder participates
with reviewers and Fabric peers, which both represent this
stakeholder’s interests.
B. Conflict mediation functionality
The described conflict mediation building blocks and the
concept of combining them to different strategies were imple-
mented and added to TANCS using the same paradigms as
used for the initial TANCS functionality:
Individual building blocks were implemented as new smart
contracts. They interact with reviewers via the CLI, and
process and persist the input of reviewers in suitable data
structures, which are stored in the distributed ledger.
Different conflict mediation strategies can be expressed as
policies that are applied to devices or device groups. Each
policy refers to those building blocks that shall be part of the
respective conflict mediation strategy.
In the case of MPA yielding a conflict, or after a round
could not mediate the conflict, TANCS determines the next
building block as defined by the strategy and executes it. The
evaluation of the result after each mediation round is likewise
administered by a policy-evaluation smart contract executed
on the peers. The state of the entire process is persisted in the
distributed ledger.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Costs vs. benefits of using a CMS
Compared to simply logging in and running a command
to configure a device, the overhead of using a CMS with
MPA and conflict mediation seems to be huge. However,
the CMS helps to prevent that invalid configurations can be
deployed. So, operating a CMS is most likely less expensive
than recovering from a severe outage, or losing customers due
to a serious data leak, etc. The additional conflict mediation
strategies proposed in this paper add further cost to the
CMS. Conflict mediation should only happen occasionally and
resulting costs are well invested as the conflict needs to be
dealt with anyway.
B. Conflict mediation vs. majority voting
The next question is whether conflict mediation increases
the chance 1) to reject invalid configurations and 2) to accept
valid configurations when under attack compared to majority
voting. For this discussion, we
assume that most of reviewers and devices are still benign.
When we assume that an invalid configuration got proposed,
MPA increases the chance that at least one reviewer will spot
the error in the first round. As a result, this configuration
is stopped and the resulting conflict must be mediated in
subsequent rounds where we enable reviewers to reconsider
their review by pointing them to the problem. Honest reviewers
that did not spot the problem and accepted the configuration,
will most likely notice the problem and reject the configura-
tion. This helps to reach consensus and to reject the invalid
configuration for good. Vice versa, adversarial reviewers that
accepted the invalid configuration can be identified when they
keep accepting the invalid configuration in subsequent rounds.
This helps to exclude adversaries.
When we assume that a valid configuration got proposed,
MPA increases the chance that it is not rejected for good in
the first round. In subsequent rounds, honest reviewers that
accidentally rejected the configuration, can be convinced by
others that the configuration is valid and to finally accept it.
Vice versa, adversarial reviewers that repeatedly try to con-
vince others to reject the valid configuration can be identified.
Additionally, BB2 (2nd channel) can actively unveil com-
promised hosts, which helps in both conflict cases to identify
adversaries.
C. Open issues
MPA and conflict mediation creates a lot of delay which can
be problematic in emergency situations where quick responses
are needed. In emergency situations, the CMS might allow
an administrator to override the MPA process and to directly
deploy a configuration. This, however, creates a loophole for
possibly malicious admins which cannot be avoided if such a
feature is required. One way of mitigating the situation is based
on logging which adds accountability of all actions performed
by the admin while overriding the MPA process.
VII. RELATED WORK
a) MPA in open-source projects: Recently, the problem
of infecting the software supply chains got more attention [4,
p. 42]. This includes injecting malicious code in open-source
projects hosted on services like GitHub or GitLab. This is
possible as such projects typically allow unknown contributors
to propose code changes, which then need to be accepted and
integrated by the project’s maintainers.
Because of this and other reasons, MPA starts to be sup-
ported by GitHub [6] and GitLab [7]. While GitHub only
allows to specify the number of reviewers, GitLab additionally
allows to specify which maintainers must perform a code
review before the change is added to the code base. As a
difference to our approach, GitHub and GitLab use processes
running on centralized servers that control the MPA process.
Our solution is based on distributed ledger and smart contract
technology.
b) Distributed consensus and fault tolerance: Distributed
consensus and fault tolerance problems deal with maintaining
the correct current state among good peers as long as the
malicious ones are a small enough minority. Such – partially
Byzantine fault tolerant – protocols have been extensively
studied [8]–[10]. While we use such algorithms as part of
the distributed ledger, they do not fit directly to the human
decision-making process in a CMS as they do not factor in
human knowledge.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we pointed out that centralized configuration
management processes must be avoided. Instead, we proposed
to use a reliable and resilient, decentralized process controlled
by a configuration management system (CMS). Such a process
can be created by the means of separation of concerns and
multi-party authorization (MPA).
However, as MPA can result in conflicts, we proposed
configurable conflict mediation strategies that pursue two
goals, namely increasing the chance 1) to reject malicious
configurations and 2) to accept good configurations when
under attack. We discussed the benefits of our approach over
majority voting and finally described how strategies can be
implemented as part of our tamper-resistant and auditable
configuration management system TANCS.
Future work includes a more formal analysis of TANCS and
an extension of the life cycle of configurations that allows to
quickly switch between authorized configurations in urgent
situations like network failures or attacks.
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